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Abstract
This paper presents arguments to evaluate soft power as perceived by the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and by China. Since the presentation of Joseph Nye’s concept 
of soft power, it has become apparent that notions of audience and message 
reception are important. We will further argue for the relevance of the psycho-
logical idea of dissonance. We will compare and contrast soft power discourses 
for their alignment with reality, and assess them for discrepancy. Ultimately, 
we will conclude that such contradictions exist and create a “dissonance” or 
disjunction, which we will explore in relation to the concept of credibility. In 
the second section, an analysis of China’s soft power serves to highlight the 
effects of the implementation by a “hard” state, in a centralized and controlled 
manner, of a soft power policy. We will examine tables in an effort to extend our 
comparison beyond the discourses perpetuated and promoted by both China 
and the EU. We will challenge these discourses using indices, including the 
World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, the Corruption 
Perception Index by Transparency International, as well as The Good Country 
Index, The Soft Power 30, and the World Justice Index, each representing a 
component of soft power as proposed by Nye, i.e., culture, political values and 
foreign policy. Additionally, we will closely examine social questions to better 
develop our understanding of soft power policy. Results indicate that while 
credibility appears more important to China than to the EU, it is, nonetheless, 
a central tenet for both parties. The third section takes a comparative approach 
to its discussion of the normative power of European and Chinese soft power. 
It reveals contradictions within the policies of both political bodies, and simul-
taneously draws two conclusions. First, that a “cultural fool” does not exist, 
i.e., individuals are able to decipher and understand messages. Secondly, that 
individuals attribute credibility or unreliability to policy messages framed by a 
state, an organization, or the media.
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1. The concept of soft power: dimensions and limits
Soft power is defined as the capacity to convince others to adhere to the 
norms, values and institutions that shape comprehensive behaviour (Nye 
2004). We may argue that the soft power concept has been extrapolated 
to non-American contexts and could be expanded to be more inclusive, 
and historicized, to take into account the role of other countries. We 
see this outlined by several Chinese scholars: Yan Xuetong 1 represents 
the political, while Yu (2007) details the cultural school. Yu argues that 
“soft power with Chinese characteristics should include values and prin-
ciples represented by the state, national and international institutions 
and political decisions driven by the state” (Yu 2007). Wang (2013a, 97), 
in a similar vein, draws on culture, Confucius’s writing, and an historical 
perspective to expand on China’s model of public diplomacy in order to 
explain the focus of the Chinese approach.
1.1. From a political to a communicative dimension
Nye (2011, 84) proposes three resources for soft power: culture, political 
values, and foreign policies. He argues that, “with soft power, what the 
target thinks is particularly important, and the target matters as much 
as the agents. Attraction and persuasion are socially constructed. Soft 
power is a dance that requires partners”. This argument shifts from rely-
ing on international relations to a more psychological stance. This shift 
is the challenge of this paper.
Nye goes beyond his general framework by examining soft power 
behaviour: agenda setting, attraction, and persuasion. Attraction is com-
posed of three elements: benignity, competence, and beauty (charisma). 
This framework is important from a theoretical point of view and for our 
discussion in comparing soft power manifestations in the EU and China.
 1 Yan Xuetong is Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at 
Tsinghua University and Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics 
(Oxford University Press).
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According to Alexander Vuving (cited in Nye 2011, 92), “Benignity 
is an aspect of how an agent relates to others. Being perceived as benign 
tends to generate sympathy, trust, credibility, and acquiescence. ‘Bril-
liance’ or ‘competence’ refers to how an agent does things and it produces 
admiration, respect, and emulation. ‘Beauty’ or ‘charisma’ is an aspect of 
an agent’s relation to ideals, values, and vision, and it tends to produce 
inspiration and adherence”.
Research shows that soft power should extend past the agent-based 
model, emitting attractive messages that “automatically” reach a foreign 
audience. Lee and Melissen (2011, 252) note that Nye’s “agent-focused 
approach to soft power overlooks critical evaluation of something that is 
basic in marketing public diplomacy work: the socialisation process that 
constitutes the necessary link between soft power and the mechanism of 
persuasion”.
Lee and Melissen (2011, 15) consider three other aspects when 
evaluating soft power resources: “The cognitive dimension refers to 
how other nations evaluate a state’s image and standing in international 
affairs. The affective dimension relates to whether other nations like 
or dislike a state despite its political, economic, and military strengths 
or weaknesses. The normative dimension reveals whether or not other 
countries regard a state policy and international role as legitimate and 
justifiable”.
1.2. Credibility and dissonance 2
Nye (2011) introduces the concept of the receiver, a key element in the 
context of soft power and in communication theories – a notion briefly 
introduced in Lee and Melissen (2011). Nye (2011, 101) explores the 
question of credibility: “To be credible in a century where power is dif-
fusing from state to non-state actors, government efforts to project soft 
power will have to accept that power is less hierarchical in an information 
age and that social networks have become more important”. In addition 
to social sciences, communication studies are developing research on 
public space, and exploring how individual, political or social identities are 
framed and portrayed in discourses. There are two noteworthy approaches. 
One is the theorization of the discourse itself (through content analysis); 
 2 “Dissonance: unsuitable in combination; clashing” (Concise Oxford English Dic-
tionary, 2008). Dissonance can relate to music and harmony, and to psychology.
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the other uses the discourse to reveal the functionality of sociopolitical 
entities and identities. This is the approach we will focus on.
We ask why Nye does not introduce more reflections on ideas such 
as place, identity and the role of the receiver from communication theo-
ries (Wolton 2009). The importance of framing during the socialisation 
process should also be taken into consideration. The choices made by 
the authors of the messages spread by the media influence the percep-
tion of events and communication (Goffman 1967; Winkin 2001). In the 
interaction process, the credibility of each actor involved in the national 
diplomatic system (Hocking and Melissen 2016) is important; it is 
another element that contributes to the reception and decoding process. 
Introducing the receiver and the socialisation process shows that “there 
is an acknowledgment that soft power and the new public diplomacy 
have a distinctly introspective dimension and that they are related to 
a nation’s self-perceptions and confidence in its own institutions” (Lee 
and Melissen 2011, 252). The question of dissonance is psychological 
and can be seen from an individual’s perspective. That is, “Dissonance 
is a discomfort caused by holding conflicting cognitions simultaneously 
(e.g., ideas, beliefs, values, emotional reactions)” (Thefacts101 2016, 
n.p.). In a state of dissonance, people may feel surprise, dread, guilt, 
anger or embarrassment. 
A culture becomes more powerful when people imagine themselves 
transformed and improved by adopting several new cultural values; such 
is the case for immigrants trying to integrate into a new society or for 
young men and women adopting fashions from Paris, Milan or London. 
When a society considers itself unique because of its political system 
or its lifestyle (for example, the US view of entrepreneurship or South 
Korea’s musical phenomenon “K-pop”), it exerts soft power as people 
increasingly participate in and subscribe to the system. Similarly, the 
migrants attracted by and to Europe positively perceive countries on the 
Continent. 
Such emotions lead to controversial perceptions and opinions about 
certain countries, since a person’s interpretation of messages and/or facts 
can raise questions about the credibility of a broadcaster in an effort to 
minimize internalised dissonance. The cumulative impact of affective, 
cognitive and normative dimensions heightens the challenge of cred-
ibility.
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2. Comparing Chinese and EU soft power: the credibility factor
2.1. Challenges to a credible Chinese soft power
We will examine the key factor(s) leading to China’s lack of credibility 
and the creation of cognitive dissonance. We will then comparatively 
examine the EU’s soft power. Both examinations will strive to highlight 
factors of credibility or non-credibility.
A survey of the historical discourses on China’s diplomacy from 
1949 to the present emphasizes the importance of pacific coexistence 
(Martin-Necker 2006). The intent of this position is to present China as 
a responsible power (Wang 2013a).
Another angle integral to our understanding of the decisions of Chi-
nese leaders after 1989 is the emergence of cultural relativism. Facing 
criticism on human rights, freedom of expression, and rules of law from 
activists and, on occasion, Western governments, China argued that 
societal development should be considered through the lens of those 
cultural, social and economic conditions pertinent to individual civiliza-
tions. In the new millennium, traditional Chinese values have broad-
ened to include peaceful and harmonious coexistence, a quality that has 
benefited both China and the larger world (Balme 2004; Billeter 2006). 
The concept of the harmonious society promoted by Chinese officials 
includes societal stability and openness and relies on a traditional under-
standing of Confucius’s moral order. Accordingly, the ruling government 
should take care of the people by implementing a patriarchal attitude 
(Wang 2013b). Applied more widely, the theory of a harmonious world 
colours China’s foreign policy by promoting it as a stable, reliable and 
responsible partner, as well as a power that can be trusted rather than 
feared (Huchet 2007; d’Hooghe 2014).
Following the debates before and during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
the Chinese government has begun to realize that the country should 
foster positive interactions based on culture and influence (Courmont 
2012; Callahan 2015). This makes China integral to defining and 
cementing concepts and theories of soft power beyond the framework 
developed by Western scholars.
China has an organised policy devoted to influencing public opinion 
through public diplomacy. This serves four goals. First, to be seen as a 
country that strives to build a harmonious society. Second, to be a reli-
able economic partner with a dynamic market economy – an argument 
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that appears to encourage reliance on Chinese state policy 3. The third 
goal is to be an active and responsible player in international affairs; and, 
fourth, to be a country that celebrates its ancient culture and traditions. 
The rapid spread of Confucius Institutes around the world, CGTN and 
CCTV channels, the National Chinese Network, and the development of 
Xinhua News Agency, which is devoted to transmitting official Chinese 
views of the world, are all well known to, and have been examined by, 
scholars. The ingredients of soft power, present here, work to counter 
reports of China made by European media, which are perceived as incor-
rectly understanding Chinese policy.
The discourse surrounding traditional culture promoted by China 
relies on a five-thousand-year heritage and includes approaches to 
medicine, cooking, martial arts, calligraphy, etc. If cooking, martial 
arts, medicine, Taoism and Buddhism are prevalent among European 
citizens, such cultural elements do not require involvement from the 
Chinese government. For example, as a practitioner of Qi Gong and Tai 
Chi Chuan between 1994 and 2014 in four European cities, we have seen 
three phases of its integration into non-Chinese communities. Initially, 
teachers came from China, or had experience of China. The next genera-
tion of teachers went to China to learn the basics at a time when the 
government recognised such practice as part of the country’s cultural 
heritage. The final period saw the structuration of teaching and clubs 
through a national federation and the opening of hundreds of courses 
in small villages or health clubs. These practices evolved indirectly from 
official teaching systems in China. While such practices may be compo-
nents of China’s soft power in its traditional aspect, independent practi-
tioners may perceive them as components of modern life. Nevertheless, 
they serve as a “channel” to Chinese culture. 
Contemporary Chinese culture also bears examination. While prod-
ucts with “Made in China” labels appear to be everywhere, China is still 
no match for the US in cultural attractiveness. If Chinese companies 
such as Huawei, Xiaomi and Alibaba are famous, few cultural icons, 
movies or artists have yet become part of a wider cultural conscious-
ness. For instance, few Western citizens are able to name Chinese con-
temporary writers, film-makers, rock singers, bands or football players. 
According to Martel (2010), China has produced no mainstream artists 
on the world stage, in spite of the rapid evolution of the cultural sphere. 
 3 Pr. Gao Fei, IEE Seminar: Mutual Trust in International Relations, Université 
Libre de Bruxelles, 2013.
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The Great Wall, a 2016 movie by Zhang Yimou, is an interesting example 
of this phenomenon. The movie was presented as a possible blockbuster, 
and accordingly featured a co-production between a Chinese film corpo-
ration and an American producer, with a screenplay to satisfy audiences. 
Not being experts on the film industry, we direct the reader to IMDb, a 
specialised website, for more detailed examination of the film’s successes. 
Critically, these are not many, and reviews are seldom positive 4. 
Nobel Prizes are also worth mentioning here; Gao Xinjian was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2000, but he has held French 
citizenship since 1998. In 2010, Liu Xiaobo received the Nobel Peace 
Prize, but he died in prison. In 2012, Mo Yan received the Nobel Prize 
for Literature, but he was identified as a supporter of the Chinese 
régime. Jirik (2016) draws similar conclusions about CCTV, arguing that 
its English representation should be indistinguishable from its competi-
tors, in order to sustain credibility.
Consequently, China and its cultural values face a double bind. 
On the one hand, the country seeks to promote the idea that “China 
is attractive because its economy is successful”. This primarily empha-
sizes China’s economic dynamism. On the other hand, values promoted 
by the PRC face internal and external challenges. In other words, it 
becomes necessary for us to ask which narrative China presents to the 
rest of the world. If it is a harmonious society, Europeans will compare 
it against their own set of values and the reality in their country. If it is 
creativity from citizens, local actors, or civil society, the examples of the 
Confucius Institutes affiliated to the PRC Ministry of Education, the Tai 
Chi Chuan practices and the example of Ai Weiwei will be insufficient to 
convince well-informed citizens of the merits of Chinese values.
2.2. The normative power of Europe: a mirror of Chinese soft power
We will now examine the soft power of the European Union. We have 
chosen the European perspective for two reasons. First, the size of the 
two regions is similar and therefore lends itself to a more meaningful 
comparison. Second, the practice in Brussels is to support the research 
of both parties. Manners (2002) defined Europe as a normative power 
that promotes nine principles: “sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable devel-
 4 https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2034800/criticreviews?ref_=tt_ov_rt [16/10/2018].
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opment, and good governance”. In Laïdi (2008b), Manners added that 
the EU disseminates in six ways: contagion, informational diffusion, 
procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filters. 
The procedure, sometimes called “Magnet Europa”, perceives “Europe 
as a normative power” (Laïdi 2008a). This author has identified the EU’s 
capacity for attraction through a normative process, as analysed in Norms 
over Force: The Enigma of European Power (Laïdi 2008a).
Applying a pragmatic approach, Rupnik (2014) examines the attrac-
tiveness of the EU by exploring the efforts of neighbouring countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavia, the Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine) 
to implement European standards while pro-European parties are in 
power. Three angles are identified: conditionality (between the EU and 
the individual country), motivation of actors, and candidates’ interests. 
The criteria are “governance more than democracy, rule of law imple-
mentation through adhesion process (towards the EU), with adoption of 
norms and institutions, independent justice, non-partisan public admin-
istration, decentralisation, fight against corruption” (29-30) 5.
For present purposes, a comparative approach is now required. Fol-
lowing the methodology of Jullien (1996), we start by examining the 
philosophical aspects of Chinese and European cultures. Such notions 
may be regarded as markers or characteristics of each society. Detailed in 
the table below is an example of a comparative approach. It is not, how-
ever, without limitations. Perhaps most notably, it is always possible for 
the level of representation to be contested. That is, it is difficult to assess 
at what level we should consider a certain generalisation as representa-
tive of the whole. The other important consideration in tabulating such 
an approach is a tendency towards amalgamating identical categories in 
order to create representative ones, and, therefore, a more acceptable 
analysis. Finally, one must be aware of the author’s culture and bias; even 
if he cannot abstract himself from them, he should retain awareness of 
them in line with anthropological research methods (Garfinkel 1967) 
(Table 1).
 5 “La gouvernance plus que la démocratie, la construction d’État de droit à tra-
vers le processus d’adhésion centré sur l’adoption de normes et d’institutions, justice 
indépendante, administration publique non partisane, décentralisation, lutte contre la 
corruption” (Rupnik 2014, 29-30; our translation).
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Table 1. – Comparing European and Chinese philosophical conceptions 
in order to introduce the comparative methodology for the next section.
In Europe In China
To oppose a “No” in order to identify 
its individuality, its personality
To reach wisdom by understanding 
the essence of the facts 
Beliefs (in religion, in technologies) Experiences
The goal The path, the way
An absolute truth A relative truth
A Creator A cosmic energy (the Qi)
Man as a measure Man as a part of the whole
Individual happiness Social order
By using this approach to soft power and perceptions, we establish a 
comparison between the social markers of Europe (Laïdi 2008b) and 
those of China. Simultaneously, we raise questions concerning credibil-
ity and dissonance. There are many rankings focusing on perceptions, 
image, reputation or global norms, such as the Best Countries Index, 
Human Development Index, Reputation Trak, Pew Research Center, 
Soft Power 3.0, World Justice Project, Reporters Without Borders, Soft 
Power Today, and the World Happiness Index. All of these use mixed 
methodology, and combine polls, media surveys and analysis based on a 
list of established criteria. The methodology of each index can be found 
on its respective website. They mostly combine items derived from the 
aggregation of data issued by international institutions (IMF, World 
Bank, UNESCO, etc.). Polls or correspondents in each country provide 
the qualitative aspects of the analysis. Each index could be contested, 
but that is not the purpose of this paper. We have selected five indices 
to illustrate the perception of countries with regard to specialised issues, 
and to highlight their behaviour on a global scale. In other words, these 
indices are a means of denoting soft power policy, and are: the World 
Press Freedom Index, Transparency Corruption Index, Good Coun-
try Index (i.e., how a country contributes to the common good), Soft 
Power 30 and the World Justice Project (Table 2).
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Table 2. – Indices for evaluating the attractiveness of the European Union and China.
Data of 2017
Index and number of countries
EU member states among 
10 first places in each Index
China
World Press Freedom, 180 SE, FI, DK, NL, BE, AU 176
Corruption Perception, 180 DK, FI, SE, LU, NL 77
Good Country Index, 163 NL, DK, FI, DE, SE, IR, UK, AU 64
Soft Power 30, 160 FR, UK, DE, SE, NL 25
World Justice Project, 113 FI, SE, DK, DE, AU, NL 75
The normative dimension, suggested by Lee (2011), depicts an accept-
able framework to challenge credibility. The purpose of such a com-
parison is to reveal differences between EU member states and China. 
In other words, the indices may reveal elements of dissonance on both 
sides. Several European countries rank highly in the five indices, with 
a few included in the top ten. These countries adhere closely to Euro-
pean values and Europe’s commitment to implementing press freedom, 
rule of law, good governance, and respecting their international com-
mitments. European soft power is illustrated by, and in accordance 
with, such behaviours. By comparison, China is systematically ranked 
unfavourably. Could it be a sign of dissonance between discourse and 
reality, reflecting the perception, and, furthermore, the credibility of 
its soft power? This could also explain why Chinese scholars and offi-
cials emphasize discourses related to promoting another framework. It 
must, however, be conceded that the methodology behind the Good 
Country Index requires improvement, and that the World Press Free-
dom Index aligns closely with Western values. We, however, argue that 
the convergence of similar rankings is a reflection on the attractiveness 
of China.
As regards the EU, it is evident that coherence and the impact of 
norm diffusion are undermined by its limited influence. For example, a 
gap exists between the EU’s human rights policy and the expectations 
of civil society or those of the European Parliament(s). Realistically, 
the EU dialogue on human rights should increase our understanding of 
those rights. Thus, contradictions exist both inside member states and in 
the EU as a whole. The migration crisis of 2015-2016 and the reaction 
to it by EU member states is a concrete example of such a discrepancy. 
China considers that economic rights are crucial to the debate. This 
is dynamically different from the fundamental position on human rights 
emphasized by Europe (Balme, cited in Laïdi 2008b, 172). 
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2.3. Limitations and discussion
Nye has been criticised for his focus on the American image, because 
it has developed into a Western framework that hinges on concepts of 
power and culture. As noted in the Introduction, while soft power with 
Chinese characteristics can be discussed, the framework remains the 
same as that for Europe’s soft power. For optimistic Chinese scholars 
and diplomats, it is possible for harmony, a notion integral to Chinese 
culture, to become a universally recognised value and thus gain a higher 
reputation and persuasive capability in the public lens. Traditional 
cultural values, with their prioritising of human perceptions, can serve 
to overcome the default Western focus on consumption and competi-
tion. The discourse of Chinese officials and media promotes economic 
growth, stability and harmony, in order to institutionalise these values.
Using culture to propose a vibrant soft power is not easy when there 
is inconsistency in the domestic reality, as noted by several scholars 
(d’Hooghe 2010; Nye 2011; Barr 2012). The development of soft power 
should not be a zero-sum game; ideas should circulate, draw from many 
sources, and include talents and members of civil society.
In conclusion, we propose two levels of analysis. The first stands 
at a micro or individual level, and emphasizes citizens’ abilities. Wolton 
(2009) and Garfinkel (1967) consider that there is no “cultural fool” in 
the communication process. This means that each person, engaged in 
a digital world with a certain degree of media literacy, is able to decode 
messages and communication strategies. According to interactionism 
sociology (Ogien and Laugier 2014, 173), an individual has four attrib-
utes: “He has a pertinent vision of the world where he lives, and the uni-
verse in which he wants to engage; he evaluates in a reasonable manner 
the form and the progress in which collective action should function; he 
can adjust his behaviour to the circumstances of the action, and he can 
give a correct description of the reasons which motivate him”. In other 
words, citizens, the general public and audiences are used to making dis-
tinctions between messages, their broadcasters and reality.
At a macro level, i.e., the national image, the problems remain the 
same. Li and Chitty (2009, 8) distinguish between “perceived images 
and projected media images of other nations”. The perceived image is 
cognitive and connected to the mental constructions of the people. The 
projected image is the result of the framing undertaken by the author 
of a communication, and then by the methods of journalists and media 
(Neveu 2009). Private and public frames determine the cognitive image 
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held by the audience. Issuing more information will not automatically 
lead to a better understanding of China’s reality by Europeans or vice 
versa.
On close examination of the affective, cognitive and normative 
dimensions, a soft power strategy emerges. This is predominantly inte-
grated into the public diplomacy policy, and is not without difficulties. 
As communication theories make clear, there is always a difference 
between what a nation believes itself to be and what other nations per-
ceive it to be. Polls and surveys are both considered reliable tools for 
highlighting such discrepancies. As regards the difference between the 
perceptions and outcomes of China’s soft power actions, China argues 
that the Western media inaccurately depict the Chinese reality. Conse-
quently, the government supports the Xinhua News Agency’s portrayal 
and broadcast of China’s image to diverse audiences 6.
A comparison of available polls and analyses of China’s online pres-
ence is necessary to further explore the concept of dissonance. Moreover, 
the combination of the cognitive and the framing approach together 
work to form a robust and comprehensive analytic framework (Table 3).
Table 3. – Conclusive results.
European Union China
Culture Mainstream artists,
acknowledged directors, sports 
players, etc.
Chinese contemporary culture has 
problems in publicizing names 
known in cinema, music, sports, 
and fine arts, etc. on a global scale.
Political values Asserted values are
inconsistently visible inside
and outside the EU.
Asserted values are relatively 
visible.
Foreign policy The migration crisis 
of Autumn 2015 demonstrates
the dissonance between values
and actions of member states
and the European Commission.
Dissonance between peace
as a value, and conflict in the South 
China Sea.
Examining China’s soft power policy and accordance with global norms 
through indices reveals an indeterminate identity. China’s policy focuses 
primarily on influence by news management, devoted to shaping a posi-
 6 On that topic, see Anne Soetemont, J’ai travaillé pour la propagande chinoise, 
Paris: Éditions du Moment, 2001.
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tive national image. Additionally, as a cultural dimension, the Confucius 
Institute network focuses predominantly on language teaching and on 
traditional culture, even though many authors believe that China’s lan-
guage promotion includes a political agenda (Hartig 2014). This conclu-
sion is reached in view of the importing of books used by the CI from 
China by the Hanban, the administrative unit co-ordinating the CI in 
Beijing 7.
We argue that China lacks an attractive contemporary culture, as 
explained by Zhang Yiwu (2018) from Peking University: “Even as 
global interest in China grows, its value system and cultural traditions 
have yet to be understood by the international community. Likewise, 
China’s creative and cultural outputs have not yet captured the attention 
and imagination of wider global audiences” (Soft Power 30 2018, 70).
While we recognize that, as elaborated by Nye, soft power is the 
attractiveness of several aspects of a country, only the cultural dimen-
sions are discussed in this paper. As said earlier, we argue that the place 
of a country in the rankings to some extent reflects its attractiveness 
dimension. Communication studies give a prominent place to the expan-
sion and reflection of identity in these discourses. The indices inform us 
as to the perceptions of the receivers. 
The position of a country in the indices reveals a dissonance between 
an official discourse and the reality of a soft power policy. If, as Nye sug-
gests, we add foreign policy to the equation, we notice a decline in the 
attractiveness of the political values typified in China’s political model. 
This reflects the perception of China as an authoritarian state or as 
deploying sharp power. Such results suggest that the political system is 
predominantly scrutinized by European citizens, both through cultural 
and foreign policy lenses, as Nye believes.
China has traditional cultural elements to promote, but no contem-
porary ones. Its strategy emphasizes media and broadcasting, in order to 
improve the alignment with China’s perception of communication. Even 
so, the present perception of the country, as revealed by the indices, is 
less than favourable.
One of the most famous Chinese political scientists offers a conclu-
sion that we adopt. For Yan Xuetong (2007), the Chinese reputation on 
the world stage largely depends on the international perceptions of its 
internal policies. Global social equilibrium, sustainable growth and some 
flexibility for citizens are key factors in revising depictions of China, and 
 7 Discussion with a CI Director, Bruxelles, March 2017.
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enable it to be more favourably received on the world stage. That is, the 
internal and external soft power must be more cohesive. This is especially 
true in view of the difficulty that countries face in controlling images and 
perceptions, the importance of which cannot be overlooked. China’s lack 
of credibility is related to its authoritarian régime. Here, China is its own 
worst enemy at making its culture acceptable at a global level, at least by 
the Western world. In 2016, Yan argued that the debate will focus on 
political might, in order to create a bipolar world (Yan 2016).
We began with culture, values and foreign policy and have ended 
with a reflection on and an evaluation of the norms where the core ele-
ments remain attractive. Combining attractiveness with credibility under 
a normative framework allows us to shift from culture, image and media 
to qualitative studies on norms elaborated by NGOs. From our point 
of view, this contributes to strengthening the analyses of soft power in 
action.
As Nye (2011) has said, the states that are ready to project soft power 
are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now 
emphasise pluralism and autonomy. China as a global power faces major 
problems that may impede the efforts by the People’s Republic of China 
to present an image of support for the country’s cultural dimensions. In 
this context, we consider that there is a dissonance and a lack of cred-
ibility regarding Chinese messages and the country’s influence on the 
world stage. 
An expansion of traditional and contemporary Chinese culture 
requires a politically relaxed environment that encourages freedom of 
expression and a free exchange of ideas among Chinese and the world 
at large. As argued by Li and Chitty (2009), framing a national image 
cannot be constructed by spending money on messages, digital broad-
casts or communication capacity without considering the target, the per-
ceived and the projected media images. Despite an extensive use of soft 
power, the government of the PRC has not yet developed an ideal mix 
of soft-power resources to achieve their desired foreign policy objectives. 
The gap between an increasingly cosmopolitan and confident foreign 
policy and a closed and rigid domestic political system is responsible for 
the imbalance between the three pillars of soft power: cultural attrac-
tiveness, examples set by domestic values, and values expressed through 
foreign policy. Examining the efforts of China from 2008 to 2011, Nye 
(2011) concludes that China’s offensive is ineffective, partly because of 
its internal policy, composed of censorship, harassment of citizens, laws 
against NGOs, and trials against foreign companies.
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